What is behind the onset of negotiations between the EU and Azerbaijan on Association Agreement?

In this note, I am going to explore the reason behind the onset of negotiations between the EU and Azerbaijan on Association Agreement. On 16 July 2010, the EU started discussions with Azerbaijan on Association agreement. The next round of discussions was held recently. In the following sentences, I argue that the start of next round of negotations at the time of increasing political tension in domestic politics is meaningful and can be explained as the EU’s ‘carrots’. Before that in order to have a full picture of processes, firstly, I would like to briefly go through ‘conditionality’ – one of three fundamental principles (Conditionality, Differentiation and Compartmentalization) upon which the EU’s strategy towards Central and Eastern European countries, as well as, South Eastern European countries has always been based, and ‘carrots’ and stick’. Conditionality is setting conditions upon third states in return of closer relations with the EU. There are tow types of conditionality: Democratic conditionality and Acquis conditionality. Acquis conditionality is applied after countries application to EU membership. But democratic conditionality can is applied to third countries that are reluctant to start democratic and economic reforms would neither be allowed to have strong political relations with the EU, nor would the be eligible to benefit from the of EU’s aid or market. So, closer relations with the EU were made conditional upon:

• the conduct of free and democratic elections
• the respect of the rule of law
• the respect of human rights
• the creation of a true market economy (D.Papadimitriou).

By promising ‘carrots’ and then showing ‘stick’ the EU coerces countries to start economic and democratic reforms. In such situation, countries calculate the cost of ignoring EU promises and accepting it, then, they make their decisions. Since the relationship between the EU and a third country is hierarchical and also when cost of ignoring promises is very high and promises are credible, as usual countries decide to accept those conditions. This kind of coercion is increased after each steps of ‘ladder’ which brings countries each time much closer to the EU. And after each step such kind of coercion is strengthened and countries are more prone to influence of the EU. Here are the steps of ‘ladder’: Co-operation and Partnership Agreement, Trade Agreement, Association Agreement, Membership Application. Azerbaijan has signed Co-operation and Partnership Agreement with the EU in 1996.

In the context of increasing political tension in Azerbaijan inspired by revolutions in the Arabs’ world, the EU started to apply this conditionality by promising ‘carrots’ and the showing ‘stick’. The EU, firstly, showed its ‘stick’. This was in different ways. Some newspapers put the picture of the president Ilham Aliyev on their first pages with ‘Despot’ headlines or criticized crash down over protestors. The OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU openly expressed their concerns about attacks on opposition journalists, arrests of protestors, youth activists. Even, the secretary general of the CE stated in his letter to the president that he was ready to visit Azerbaijan to discuss issues mentioned above. Some national MPs of European countries harshly criticized Azeri Government’s because of use of force against peaceful protesters. The last issue was the visit of twenty officials of Europe which included ambassadors of some European countries and representatives and delegations of European institutions to the headquarters of Musavat party which was the sign of the support to Azeri opposition. Now, the EU is showing its ‘carrots’ by starting negotiation on stabilization and association agreement. Just to give example, the same happened in Macedonia in 2001 during the conflict between Albanian Liberation Army which represented Albanian minority in Macedonia and Macedonian government. The EU signed stabilization and Association agreement in March 2001 when the conflict was in its highest point. But what will happen if Azerbaijan signs the agreement? By signing this agreement, Azerbaijan will move into the sphere of influence of the Union by allowing the EU to judge domestic political situation of the country, and Azeri Government will be more vulnerable to external pressure originating from the EU and its member states. It will be legitimization of external influence. Thus, the EU will be an effective centre of international pressure. Moreover, Western public opinion in domestic politics of Azerbaijan will increase. In this scenario, there will be dilemma between ‘path to Europe’ and interference in domestic politics. Attempts to smooth the pressure by accepting some of conditions will not be successful, as they never were. In other scenario, where the EU fails to affect government the result is not in favour of government again. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier state that even if EU incentives failed to affect an authoritarian government directly, exclusion by the EU signalled to the society in this state that the incumbent government was the main obstacle to their country’s relationship with the EU and these signals will mobilize society against the government. Attempts to change such governments in this way were successful in the Balkans and Slovakia. These are just scenarios. I might be wrong. However, the intention behind the start or the second round of negotiations is clear – ‘carrots’.
P.S. This is a rule transfer by external incentives. But this mode of rule transfer is not preferable in comparison with other two modes: social learning and lesson-drawing because rules that are transferred through social learning or lesson-drawing are much less contested domestically, and implementation is more likely to result in behavioural rule adoption and sustained compliance (Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier).

Papadimitriou D. 2001. “The EU’s Strategy in Post-Communist Balkans’. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 1(3): 69-94

Schimmelfennig, F., and Sedelmeier, U., 2004. “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe”. Journal of European Public Policy 11:4, 661-679